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Abstract
Some Colombian commercial banks have used the strategy of oﬀering promotional
prizes in order to attract new savings customers. In this paper we develop a two-stage
game model that allows us to understand the eﬀects of this promotional strategy on
the deposit interest rates, the deposit market shares and the intermediation spreads.
We ﬁnd that under this strategy it is possible for the bank that oﬀers the highest
prize to segment the deposit market serving only customers that assign high subjective
probabilities to winning prizes. More importantly we show that the bank that oﬀers
the highest promotional prize not only pays the lowest deposit interest rate but also
has the largest deposit market share and the widest intermediation spread.
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1Since the mid 1990’s, some Colombian commercial banks have oﬀered prizes to attract new
customers who want to open savings accounts. Cars, houses, and cash have been some of the
prizes oﬀered to try to capture the attention of new depositors. The new promotion strategy
works like a lottery or a raﬄe, in the sense that it is not certain that potential new customers
will win the prize. Despite the uncertainty of the prize, depositors have welcomed the new
banking promotional strategy. This fact suggests that Colombian commercial banks have
found a new strategy to compete in the deposit market as an alternative to using interest
rates.
It is clear that this innovative activity of promotional prizes must respond to some eco-
nomic forces. At ﬁrst glance the motivation of this activity can be explained by the banks’
desire of acquiring a bigger deposit market share. However, the explanation is not as simple.
As suggested by Silber (1983), new ﬁnancial practices are in general designed to lessen the
constraints imposed on banks in order to achieve a particular goal. These constraints can be
external and internal such as government regulations, high interest rates, high inﬂation rates
and the type of market structure, among others. In this sense, Colombian banks’ strategy
of oﬀering prizes can be understood as a way to loosen some of their internal and external
constraints in order to increase their deposits or their access to funds sources.
The type of constraints may vary across banks. However there are some constraints that
are common for all the banks. For instance, after implementing diverse ﬁnancial innovations,
banks repeatedly face the internal constraint of having the interest rate as the only simple
instrument to stimulate deposits. But oﬀering higher interest rates to attract deposits also
implies rising the costs paid by the bank. In addition if market interest rates are already
high or the government regulates them, then the use of the interest rates as a tool to capture
more savings can be externally constrained.
Some empirical evidence from Colombia supports the importance of the aforementioned
external constraints. In particular it has been argued that the interest rates have been high
during the last decade. According to Greco (1999) in the period 1990 to 1997, the nominal
annual interest rate on loans oscillated roughly between 34% and 47%, while the annual
nominal interest rate on deposits oscillated between 23% and 37%. These levels of interest
rates were considered high since in the same period there were several episodes in which the
Central Bank tried to lower and regulate them.
It is important to observe that the Colombian banks prize strategy since the mid 1990’s
2can be understood not only as a strategy to loosen some contraints in order to stimulate
deposits. It can be also understood as an attempt to relax these constraints to increase
their intermediation spread up to their historical high levels. In fact, Barajas et al. (1999)
mention that the interest rate spread declined steadily from an initial level of about 25% in
1991 to 19% in 1996.
Based on all these stylized facts, in this paper we develop a model that explains how
oﬀering prizes to their new savings customers, banks can reduce the interest rate paid on
deposits, increase their intermediation spread, and stimulate the demand for deposits.
We model Banks as ﬁrms that compete in the deposits market. They supply savings
accounts that can be characterized by two features: ﬁrst, their interest rate and second,
their potential prize.
More formally we construct a model in which banks diﬀerentiate horizontally and verti-
cally.1 The horizontal diﬀerentiation is based on the diﬀerent and exogenous physical location
of the banks, which aﬀects their interest rate on deposits due to transportation costs. The
vertical diﬀerentiation comes from the banks’ strategy of oﬀering promotional prizes to their
customers. In this sense the prize can be viewed as an improvement in the quality of the
savings accounts.
We model competition between banks as a two-stage game duopoly. In the ﬁrst stage
banks simultaneously decide the value of the prize they oﬀer in order to attract new savings
customers. In the second stage, banks compete with the interest rate that they pay on
deposits.
It is important to note that we do not explicitly model the decision of oﬀering and not-
oﬀering a prize. This decision is implicitly taken by each bank when it decides to oﬀer a
p o s i t i v ev a l u eo ft h ep r i z eo rap r i z ew h o s ev a l u ei sz e r o . 2 Moreover, the goal of our model
is not to explain why some banks have not adopted the prize strategy. Instead we want to
use the model to explain how the aforementioned strategy has aﬀected interest rates spreads
and deposits in the banks that adopted the strategy.
The prize strategy can be seen as an instrument that segments the depositors according
to the subjective probability that these customers assign to win the prize. This probability is
1Two products are horizontally diﬀerentiated when there is no ranking among consumers based on their
willingness-to-pay for the two products. On the other hand two products are vertically diﬀerentiated when
there exits such a ranking. See Neven and Thisse (1982).
2To model the decision of oﬀering and not-oﬀering a prize we can include another stage at the beginning
of the game.
3a measure of the their taste for raﬄes and lotteries, and can be considered as the probability-
type of each individual.3 Depending on the unitary cost of transportation and the diﬀerence
between the prizes’ values, there are two types of segmentation or dominance. If the unitary
cost of transportation for the savings customers is greater than the diﬀerence between the
prizes’ values, then the banks serve all the customers’ probability-types, regardless of the
subjective probability that the depositors assign to winning the prize. This case is described
as horizontal dominance. On the other hand, if the unitary cost of transportation is less
than the diﬀerence between the prizes’ values, then the bank that oﬀers the highest prize
attracts only customers that assign a subjective high probability of winning the prize. In
other words, this bank ends with a zero market share for low probability-type depositors.
This situation corresponds to vertical dominance.
We ﬁnd that the equilibrium of the two-stage game depends on the type of dominance.
Under horizontal dominance we obtain a symmetric equilibrium. That is, both banks oﬀer
the same prize, the same deposit interest rates and have the same deposit market share.
Under vertical dominance we derive an asymmetric equilibrium where only one bank oﬀers
a prize. This bank pays the lowest interest rate and has the largest deposit market share
and the widest intermediation spread. Moreover this bank specializes completely in serving
customers that assign a subjective high probability to winning the prize, while the bank
whose prize is zero specializes in serving low probability-type customers.
We also deﬁne and solve a benchmark game. This is a simple game in which banks
only compete with deposit interest rates. Comparing the equilibrium of this game with
the equilibrium of the two-stage game lead to some interesting results. We ﬁnd that under
horizontal dominance, the equilibrium interest rates and the market shares of the two stage
game are the same as the ones that are obtained under the benchmark game. On the other
hand, under vertical dominance, the bank that oﬀers a positive prize reduces its deposit
interest rate and increases its deposit market share in comparison with the ones that it has
under the benchmark game. Furthermore the bank that does not oﬀer any prize pays a higher
interest rate and has a lower deposit market share than those it has under the benchmark
game.
Our model is based on the large literature of industrial organization that has studied
price competition among ﬁrms under horizontal diﬀerentiation and/or under vertical diﬀer-
3The word probability-type is introduced since the type of each individual is deﬁned by the location of
each individual and the probability that she assigns to win the prize (taste for raﬄes). It will be discussed
in section 2.
4entiation. Some examples of models of horizontal diﬀerentiation, also known as the “address
location” approach, are Hotelling (1929), d’Aspremont et al. (1979), Salop (1979) and
Economides (1989a). Some prototypes of models of vertical diﬀerentiation are Mussa and
Rossen (1978) and Shaked and Sutton (1983). In addition, Economides (1989b), Econo-
mides (1993), Neven and Thissen (1990) and Dos Santos and Thisse (1996) are models that
simultaneously study and integrate vertical and horizontal diﬀerentiation considering solely
two characteristics of the products: variety and quality.
There are also articles that have been written to explain the industrial organization of
banking including the concepts of vertical or horizontal diﬀerentiation. Some of them relied
on previous results derived in the price competition papers aforementioned. In general the
structure of these banking models is based upon the circular-city model of Salop (1979).
Adapting this structure to banking competition has allowed researchers to study diﬀerent
problems. For instance, Freixas and Rochet (1997) use this structure to ﬁnd the optimal
number of banks while Chiappori et al. (1995) apply it to study the impact of deposit rate
regulation on credit rates. In addition, Matutes and Padilla (1994) utilize this structure
to ﬁnd the appropriate level of interbank cooperation in automated teller machine (ATM)
networks, whereas Bouckaert and Degryse (1995) apply it to analyze the consequences of the
introduction of phone banking. Most of these models do not consider vertical diﬀerentiation
among banks. If they consider it, like in Bouckaert and Degryse (1995), they assume that
the depositors have the same taste for the quality-option that the banks oﬀer. Therefore it
is important to emphasize that the model that we develop in this paper makes explicit the
interaction between vertical and horizontal product diﬀerentiation as Degryse (1996) does
to analyze the conditions under which banks oﬀer remote access.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 we describe the set up of the
model; in Section 3 we solve the two-stage game and state and analyze the main results of
this game; ﬁnally, in Section 4 we present some concluding remarks.
5We assume that there is a duopolistic industry of banks in the deposit market.4 The two
banks are denoted by Bank 1 and Bank 2. Each bank has a single branch that is located
on a circle with unit circumference. For simplicity we suppose that the banks are already
located at a distance of 1/2 from each other.
We model competition for deposits as a two-stage game. In the ﬁrst stage banks simul-
taneously decide the value of the prize, qi [0, ), that they oﬀer to attract new savings
customers. In the second stage, banks compete with deposit interest rates, ri [0, ).
Following Economides (1993), we argue that this timing is justiﬁed by the fact that all
strategic variables are not equally ﬂexible. In the short-run, interest rates can be easier to
change than the prize strategy. The reason is that there is a promotional and advertising
campaign associated with the prize strategy that takes time to design and it may be diﬃcult
to change.
From the timing of the game and the fact that banks’ locations are given exogenously it
is evident that our purpose in this model is to focus on the introduction of prizes and their
interaction with interest rates and deposit market shares. However it is important to notice
that although banks do not choose their location, their deposit accounts are still characterized
by two features: ﬁrst, the exogenously given location of the bank that implicitly deﬁnes the
physical accessibility to it and aﬀects the deposit interest rate through transportation costs;
second, the value of the prize.
As in many of the papers of banking, that were mentioned above, we take the existence
of banks as given and concentrates only on their liability side.5 The deposits, Di, that the
banks attract, are invested to obtain an identical and ﬁxed return R ri per unit of money.
Therefore the intermediation spread can be deﬁned as (R ri).
Each bank i maximizes proﬁts, πi
πi =( R ri)Di C(qi)( 1 )
4For the purpose of this paper it is suﬃcient to consider only two banks. An extension to more banks is
straightforward. However graphical analysis becomes cumbersome for models with more than two banks.
5We are excluding the possible competition that banks can have in the credit market. This exclusion
simpliﬁes the model and makes it more tractable. Note that in reality banks, like intermediaries of any
kind, face a double competition, i.e. simultaneous competition on loans (credit market) and deposits (deposit
market). To model this kind of competition some assumptions in terms of timing are required . But the
timing of these games can aﬀect the market structure. For instance, an oligopolistic competition in the





where C(qi) represents the cost function for the bank of oﬀering the prize qi.W e a s s u m e
that the function C(qi) is increasing at an increasing rate (C0(qi) > 0a n dC00(qi) > 0).
The intuition of this assumption is that each bank is willing to oﬀer higher prizes to attract
more customers; but this implies that it also has to invest more resources in advertising and
promotion to reach not only the individuals near the bank but also the individuals that are
closer to its competitor.
We assume that each depositor is endowed with one unit of money that she invests at only
one of the two banks. Depositor preferences vary along two dimensions. First, each depositor
has a unique location z on the circumference with z [0,1] and measured with respect to
the bank i. Second, each depositor has a taste for raﬄes or prizes. This taste is represented
by the subjective probability that individuals assign to winning the prize. This probability
is denoted by θ [0,1] and also describes the probability-type of each depositor. In this
sense individuals diﬀer in their probability-type.
It is important to emphasize that it is not certain that when a depositor opens a new
savings account in a bank she will win the prize oﬀered by this bank. She only gets the
option of participating in a raﬄe.
Under these assumptions we can characterize each depositor by the type (θ,z). As in
Economides (1993) and Degryse (1996), we can represent the space of the depositors’ char-
acteristics by the cylinder [0,1] [0,1] (see Figure 1). Moreover, we suppose that depositors
are uniformly distributed over the surface of the cylinder with probability density equal to
one. Therefore the total mass of these depositors corresponds to one.
7We assume that depositors are risk-neutral. The expected utility for each individual of
depositing one unit of money in the bank i can be expressed as
U(qi;z,θ)=E(u(qi;z,θ)) = θ[ω + ri tz + qi]+( 1 θ)[ω + ri tz]
Thus,
U(qi;z,θ)=ω + ri tz + θqi (2)
where ω is the reservation value that we suppose to be large enough such that the deposit
market is covered; and t is the unitary cost of transportation. As Matutes and Vives (1996)
point out, it is interesting to observe that the transportation costs, tz, can be understood
in diﬀerent ways. They do not only represent the depositors’ cost of time spent traveling to
the bank but also represent the bank’s provision of diverse services such as ATM network
sizes or consumer credit facilities, among others.
We proceed to derive the demand for deposits. As it was stated before we assume that
there are only two banks i =1 ,2. Without loss of generality we suppose that the Bank
1o ﬀers a higher prize than the Bank 2, q1 q2. Using the utility function in (2), it is
possible to derive the set of depositors that are indiﬀerent between Banks 1 and 2. For any
probability-type θ [0,1], the marginal depositor is found by solving for the location z that
makes her indiﬀerent between the two banks. In other words, using the expected utility (2)
the location z solves6











+ θ(q1 q2) (3)
where x(θ) represents the market share of Bank 1 for the probability-types θ. This is a
linear and increasing function in θ that partitions the total deposit market in two groups of
depositors. It deﬁnes the market area of each bank, as illustrated in Figure 2. An increase
in r1 (decrease in r2), shifts the function to the left increasing the market area of Bank 1
and reducing the market area of Bank 2.
6Note that for each individual the assigned probability of winning the prize q1is the same as the assigned
probability of winning the prize q2.
8Figure 2:
To determine the demand for deposits of Bank 1, D1,as a function of the interest rate
r1,we integrate the function x(θ)o ft h ee q u a t i o n( 3 )o v e r[ 0 ,1] taking into account the
appropriate range of r1. There are 5 ranges and we continue describing them.
Given r2, for “very low” values of r1 ,and regardless of the magnitude of the slope
(q1−q2)
t ,
the line x(θ) does not cross the unit square in Figure 2. This deﬁnes the segment of the
demand that we call DI
1.F o r“ l o w ”v a l u e so fr1,g i v e nr2 and regardless of
(q1−q2)
t , the line
x(θ) crosses the bottom and the right side of the unit square in Figure 2. This determines
the segment of the demand that corresponds to DII
1 .G i v e nr2 and for “intermediate values”
r1 the function x(θ) can cross either the vertical sides or the horizontal sides of the unit






< 1 (q1 q2) <t
This means that the diﬀerence between the value of the prizes oﬀered by the banks
(q1 q2) is less than the unitary cost of transportation, t. This situation is known as
horizontal dominance (q1 q2 <t ).7 Under this situation, Bank 1 attracts a strictly positive
7See Degryse (1996).









market of the low probability-type depositors, but it does not serve the entire market for the
high probability-type depositors (see Figure 3).






> 1 (q1 q2) >t
In this situation, the diﬀerence between the value of the prizes oﬀered by the banks
(q1 q2) is greater than the linear rate cost of transportation, t. This situation is referred
to as vertical dominance (q1 q2 >t ). Under this situation, Bank 1 attracts the entire
market of the high probability-type depositors and has a zero market share for the low
probability-type depositors (see Figure 4).







there is neither vertical nor horizontal dominance.
Under these two situations, vertical dominance and horizontal dominance, the segment
of the demand function for deposits will be called DIII
1 .
For “high” values of r1,g i v e nr2 and independently of the slope
(q1−q2)
t ,t h el i n ex(θ)
crosses the top and the left side of the unit square. This determines the segment of the
10(23) is  
violated 







demand that we call DIV
1 . Finally, given r2, for “very high” values of r1, and independently
of the slope
(q1−q2)
t , the line x(θ) does not cross the unit square. This deﬁnes the segment of
the demand that corresponds to DV
1 .
The details for the derivation of the demand for deposits for bank 1, D1, can be found
in the Appendix 1. In this part of the paper we only present the derived functional forms
for this demand and give speciﬁc meaning to the aforementioned terms “very low”, “low”,
“intermediate”, “high” and “very high”, through closed intervals for the deposit interest rate
r1.
The results (derived functional form) can be summarized as follows. First, for a “very
low” interest rate, r1 [0,r 2
t
2 (q1 q2)] = [0,r min
1 ], and regardless of the type of
dominance, it can be established that
D
I
1 =0 ( 4 )
Second, if horizontal dominance (q1 q2 <t ) prevails, then a “low” interest rate satisﬁes
r1 [r2
t




1,h]. On the other hand, if vertical dominance
(q1 q2 >t ) prevails, then a ”low” interest rate satisﬁes r1 [r2
t

















Third, under horizontal dominance (q1 q2 <t ), when the “intermediate” interest rate
satisﬁes r1 [r2
t
2,r 2 + t
2 (q1 q2)] = [r1
1,h,r 2













Under vertical dominance (q1 q2 >t ), when the “intermediate” interest rate satisﬁes
r1 [r2 + t










[r1 r2 +( q1 q2)] (7)
Fourth, we ﬁnd that if horizontal dominance (q1 q2 <t ) prevails then a “high” interest rate
satisﬁes r1 [r2+ t
2 (q1 q2),r 2+ t
2]=[ r2
1,h,r max
1 ]. On the other hand, if vertical dominance
(q1 q2 >t ) prevails then a “high” interest rate satisﬁes r1 [r2
t













Finally, for the last range, under both types of dominance and for a “very high” interest
rate r1 [r2 + t
2, )=[ rmax
1 , ), we establish that
D
V
1 =1 ( 9 )
It is important to observe that under neither vertical dominance nor horizontal dominance









1 are strictly convex, linear and strictly concave, respectively. However diﬀerentiability
is not assured.8 Figure 5 illustrates a typical demand function for the deposits of Bank 1.
The demand function for deposits of Bank 2 with respect to r2 can be derived similarly
as we derived the demand function for Bank 1. The shape is the same as the one in Figure
5 . Moreover note that the relation D2 =1 D1 holds, since the whole market for deposits
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The game of this model can be solved applying the principle of backward induction. This
means that we ﬁrst, solve the deposit interest rate subgame (second stage) and then we solve
the prize game (ﬁrst stage).
This subgame is a typical Bertrand competition game applied to the Banking industry. Given
t, q1 and q2, there are six types of equilibria in this subgame or second stage: three under
vertical dominance and three under horizontal dominance.9
In other words for each type of dominance there are three cases that determine the type
of equilibrium achieved in this stage:
Case 1: The equilibrium appears on the linear segments of the demand for deposits
of each bank, that is DIII
1 and DIII
2 .
9This part follows Neven and Thisse (1990).
13Case 2: The equilibrium occurs on the strictly concave segment of D1 and on the




Case 3: The equilibrium rises on the strictly convex segment of D1 and on the strictly
concave segment of D2. This means that the equilibrium is present on DIV
1 and DII
2 .
Before calculating these equilibria it is important to notice their existence can be proven




i where i =1 ,2, are strictly convex, strictly concave and strictly
concave in ri respectively. This implies that these functions are also strictly quasiconcave
along their respective interval of interest rates. Moreover they are continuous on the interest
rates of the banks but not necessarily diﬀerentiable. In addition, the intervals of the interest
rates over which these proﬁt functions are deﬁned, are non-empty, convex and compact
subsets of the Euclidean Space R. Therefore all the conditions are satisﬁed to assure the
existence of a Nash Equilibrium in pure strategies in each subgame.10 Furthermore, since
the proﬁt functions are strictly quasiconcave in ri a unique equilibrium is assured for the
respective subgames.
The equilibria of the subgames are presented in this part of the paper. In each case,
vertical and horizontal dominance are analyzed sequentially.
Case 1
Under horizontal dominance (q1 q2 <t )a n di fr1 [r2
t
2,r 2+ t





2 +( q1 q2),r 1 + t
2]=[ r1
2,h,r 2
2,h], then the proﬁts maximization problems for
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In other words (10) and (11) represent the interest rate equilibrium for the parameter
region deﬁned by (12) and (13). See Figure 3. Based on this equilibrium we can calculate




























































1,v]a n dr2 [r1 + t
2,r 1
t
2 +( q1 q2)] = [r1
2,v,r 2
2,v], then the proﬁts
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This equilibrium is also unique and satisﬁes that r∗
1,v [r∗
2,v + t




















In other words (20) and (21) represent the interest rate equilibrium for the parameter
region deﬁned by (22) and (23). See Figure 4. We can use these interest rates to derive the






































For this case the equilibrium deposit interest rates have the same functional form under
both types of dominance. The only particular feature for each type of dominance is the
range or intervals of the interest rates for which this equilibrium is valid. Moreover, the
intermediation spreads, the proﬁts functions and the demand functions evaluated at the
equilibrium interest rates have the same functional form under both types of dominance.
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Using these equilibrium interest rates we can determine the deposits demands, proﬁts and
intermediation spreads for both banks. This is accomplished in the Appendix 3. We do not
present these results in this part since as we will discuss below, Case 2 lacks of importance.
Under horizontal dominance (q1 q2 <t ) the equilibrium described by equations (30) and
(31) are valid if r1 [r2
t
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2 ]. Under vertical dominance (q1 q2 >t ) the equilibrium characterized by
equations (30) and (31) hold if r1 [r2
t
2 (q1 q2),r 2 + t





2 +( q1 q2),r 1 + t
2 +( q1 q2)] = [r2
2,v,r max
2 ]. Therefore using (30) and (31) we



















11See the First Order Conditions in the Appendix 2.
17Note that in this case condition (12) is violated.
On the other hand, under vertical dominance the equilibrium given by (30) and (31) is
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Note that in this case condition (32) is violated.






2,h. On the other hand if (33) is satisﬁed with equality (q1 q2 =
3t




2,v. This means that the equilibrium interest rates vary
continuously as q1,q 2, and t change.
Case 3
For this case, the equilibrium deposit interest rates also have the same functional forms
under both types of dominance. As in Case 2, the only particular characteristic for each
type of dominance is the range or intervals of the interest rates for which this equilibrium
holds. Moreover the intermediation spreads, the proﬁts functions and the demand functions
evaluated at the equilibrium have the same functional form under both types of dominance.
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(35)
12See the First Order Conditions in the Appendix 2.
18Using these equilibrium interest rates we can determine the deposits demands, proﬁts and
intermediation spreads for both banks. See Appendix 3. We do not present these results
in this part since as we will argue below, Case 2 lacks of importance. Under horizontal
dominance (q1 q2 <t ) the results presented by equations (34) and (35) are valid if r1
[r2 + t
2 (q1 q2),r 2 + t
2]=[ r2
1,h,r max
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1 ,r 1
2,h].
Under vertical dominance (q1 q2 >t ) the results presented by equations (34) and (35) hold
if r1 [r2
t
2,r 2 + t
2]=[ r2
1,v,r max
1 ]a n dr2 [r1
t























Note that in this case condition (13) is violated. On the other hand, under vertical
















Note that in this case condition (23) is violated.
Finally it is important to notice that when (36) is satisﬁed with equality (q1 q2 = 3t











2,v. As was mentioned before this means that the equilibrium
interest rates vary continuously as q1,q 2, and t change.
3.1.1 Comparative and Static Analysis
It is interesting to analyze and compare some of the partial results from the second stage of
the game. We only analyze the results from Case 1, that is, the results of the interest rate
equilibrium that correspond to the linear segments of the demand for deposits of each bank,
DIII
1 and DIII
2 . We restrict the analysis to this case, because as will be shown later, for the
ﬁrst stage of the game there are no values of the prizes and the rate of the transportation
cost that support the interest rate equilibrium of cases 2 and 3. In this sense these two cases
lack of importance.
The following proposition summarizes the main result of the comparative and static
analysis. We warn the reader about the interpretation of the proposition since this is a
19partial analysis in the sense that we have not yet completed the task of solving the two-stage
game. In this sense the following proposition and results should always be understood taking
into account that the prizes q1 and q2 are given in the second stage of the game. However
so far we cannot say anything about the optimality of the given prizes.
Proposition 1 In the second stage of the game, regardless of the type of dominance, vertical
or horizontal, the bank that oﬀered the highest prize in the ﬁrst stage pays the lowest deposit
interest rate, acquires the largest deposit market share and enjoys the widest intermediation
spread.
Proof. The proof is straightforward. Use (10), (11), (14) and (15) to derive the fol-









2,v . In addition, since the intermediation margin has the simple form: R ri
then the bank that pays the lowest interest rate enjoys also the widest intermediation spread
(R r∗
1,h >R r∗
2,h and R r∗
1,v >R r∗
2,v).
Even if Proposition 1 is derived from a partial analysis in the sense that we have not solved
the complete two-stage game, it has an important implication. This proposition suggests
that under both types of dominance a bank has an incentive to oﬀer higher prizes than its
competitor since this strategy assures it a wider intermediation spread and a larger deposit
market share.
There are other interesting results that come from this partial analysis. In terms of
the equilibrium market share there is a diﬀerence between the two kinds of dominance. In
qualitative terms, under vertical dominance there is a probability-type segmentation of the
market. The bank that oﬀers the highest prize specializes in serving high probability-type
depositors while the bank that oﬀers the lowest prize serves low probability-type individuals
(see Figure 4). Under horizontal.dominance, both banks serve all the diﬀerent probability-
types individuals. In quantitative terms, note that the market share of the bank that oﬀers
the highest prize is greater under vertical dominance than the one under horizontal domi-














This suggests that the bank that oﬀers better prizes than its competitor also has an
incentive to segment the market according to the probability-type of the individuals.


































































It is important to notice that under both types of dominance the equilibrium interest rate
paid by a bank decreases as the value of the oﬀered prize by this bank increases. On the other
hand, the equilibrium interest rate for a bank increases as the value of the prize oﬀered by
its competitor increases. Furthermore, under horizontal dominance, the demand for deposits
of a bank increases as the value of the prize oﬀered by this bank increases. However, this
demand for deposits decreases as the value of the prize oﬀered by its competitor increases.
Under vertical dominance is it striking that there is no eﬀect of the prizes on the demand
for deposits of each bank.
Once the equilibrium of the second stage is found, the ﬁrst stage of the problem can be
solved to derive the equilibrium prize. In Section 2, we proposed an increasing and convex
function C(qi)i nqi to describe the costs of the promotional prize strategy. For simplicity




It is important to notice that we are implicitly assuming that both banks have the same
technology to design a promotion campaign for the prize that they are oﬀering. The only
diﬀerence in their costs is the prize qi that they are oﬀering.
The introduction of the aforementioned cost function brings the attention upon some
previous works in the banking literature. In particular we do not understand why models of
banking like Matutes and Padilla (1994), Bouckaert and Degryse(1995) and Degryse (1996),
explicitly omit the costs of the banking technological innovations. In other words it is not
clear why these papers implicitly claim that the assumption of a costless technology is not
21relevant for their results. We believe the introduction of these costs can aﬀect the results
that they obtain.
If we apply the assumption of a costless technology of these papers to the present model,
it is necessary to constrain the value of the prizes to an interval [0, ¯ q], otherwise the banks can
end choosing unrealistically an inﬁnite prize in the ﬁrst stage. This is the same assumption
used in models where the vertical diﬀerentiation is related with quality, like in Neven and
Thisse (1990), Economides (1989b) and Economides (1993).
Once more, the equilibria for this ﬁrst stage can be characterized according to the type
of dominance. Therefore we analyze Cases 1,2and 3 sequentially.
Case 1
Under horizontal dominance (q1 q2 <t ) the proﬁt maximization problems for the banks









































Using equations (10), (11) and (14)-(19) the equilibrium interest rates, the equilibrium



































22Under vertical dominance (q1 q2 >t ) the proﬁt maximization problems for the banks































2,v = 0 (43)
Using equations (20), (21) and (24)-(29) the equilibrium interest rates, the equilibrium














































These results for both types of dominance are summarized in the following two proposi-
tions.
Proposition 2 For the two-stage game, if there is horizontal dominance (q1 q2 <t )a n d
if the cost functions are described by C(qi)=q2
i where i =1 ,2 then a symmetric equilibrium
is obtained in which both banks select the same prizes and the same deposit interest rates.
These in turn imply that both banks acquire the same deposit market shares and receive the
same proﬁts.
Proposition 3 For the two-stage game, if there is vertical dominance (q1 q2 >t )a n di ft h e
cost functions are described by C(qi)=q2
i where i =1 ,2 then Bank 1 oﬀers a positive prize
w h i l eB a n k2d o e sn o to ﬀer any prize. Moreover Bank 1 not only pays the lowest deposit
interest rate but also has the largest deposit market share and the widest intermediation
spread.
23This last proposition is more robust than Proposition 1, since it is a proposition that is
derived based on the whole two-stage game. Therefore in contrast to Proposition 1, these
Proposition 2 and 3 suggest that only under vertical dominance a bank has an incentive to
oﬀer higher prizes than its competitor since this strategy assures it a wider intermediation
spread and a larger deposit market share. Moreover notice that under vertical dominance,
Bank 1 segments the deposit market serving only high probability-type customers while
Bank 2 specializes in serving low probability-type customers (see Figure 4).
We proceed analyzing Cases 2 and 3. In both cases we argue that there is not a pair of
prizes (q∗
1,q∗
2) that supports the equilibrium interest rates derived for the second stage
Case 2
The following propositions are useful to discard an equilibrium for this case.
Proposition 4 F o rt h ep a r a m e t e rr e g i o nd e ﬁned by (q1 q2) 3t
2 and under horizontal
dominance, (q1 q2) <t , there is not a pair of prizes (q∗
1,q∗
2) that supports the equilibrium
of the interest rate deﬁned by (30) and (31).
Proof. The proof is straightforward. Take the inequalities 2(q1 q2) 3t and 2(q1 q2) <
2t and note that there are no positive values of (q1 q2)t h a ts a t i s f yb o t hi n e q u a l i t i e sa t
the same time. Therefore it is not possible to support the equilibrium of the interest rate
deﬁned by (30) and (31).
Proposition 5 For the parameter region deﬁned by 3t
4 (q1 q2) and under vertical domi-
nance, (q1 q2) >t ,t h e r ei sn oap a i ro fp r i z e s( q∗
1,q∗
2) that supports the equilibrium of the
interest rate deﬁned by (30) and (31).
Proof. The proof is straightforward. Take the inequalities 3t 4(q1 q2) and 3(q1 q2) >
3t and note that there are no positive values of (q1 q2) that satisfy both inequalities at the
same time. Hence it is not possible to support the equilibrium of the interest rate deﬁned by
(30) and (31).
Case 3
This case is the most diﬃcult because it is not possible to derive an explicit expression for
the equilibrium prizes. The reason is that under both types of dominance, the First Order
Conditions of the proﬁt maximization problems are cumbersome and non-linear equations
24on the prizes. Therefore they cannot be solved analytically.13 However it is possible to
solve numerically for the equilibrium prizes. Simulations for diﬀerent values of the unitary
cost of transportation, t, suggest that the equilibrium is asymmetric. We obtain that q∗
1 >
0a n dq∗
2 = 0, regardless of the type of dominance. However for all the simulations we
ﬁnd that (q∗
1,q∗
2) does not satisfy (36) under horizontal dominance, and (37) under vertical
dominance. Thus we argue that under this case it is not possible to ﬁnd equilibrium prizes
in the ﬁrst stage that support the equilibrium interest rates described by (34) and (35).
The previous analysis is useful to emphasize that the only equilibria that are relevant for
t h et w o - s t a g eg a m ea r et h o s ed e r i v e di nt h eC a s e1 .H e n c ew ew i l lc o n t i n u ef o c u s i n go nt h i s
case.
In order to understand the impact of the introduction of “prizes” in the banking industry
upon interest rates, demand deposits and intermediation spreads, it is useful to pursue
the following exercise. We will compare the equilibria of two diﬀerent duopolistic banking
industries. The ﬁrst industry is characterized by two banks that compete using solely their
deposits interest rates. Banks do not oﬀer prizes or raﬄe s .T h i si sd e ﬁned as the benchmark
game The second industry is characterized by the two banks that are involved in the two-
s t a g eg a m et h a tw es o l v e da b o v e .
We proceed analyzing the benchmark game. In this game, two banks are involved in a
Bertrand competition using as strategies their deposits interest rates. This game is the same
game as in Salop (1979) that is applied for the case of banking in Freixas and Rochet (1997).
As before we can ﬁnd the marginal depositor by solving for the location z that makes
her indiﬀerent between the two banks. In other words using the utilities derived from the
services of each bank, the location z solves




and deﬁning x =2 z we obtain







where x represents the market share of Bank 1. Note that in comparison to equation (3), x
in (48) is an independent function of the probability-type of the individuals (θ).
13These conditions are available from the author upon request.






















and using it we can derive the demands for deposits, the proﬁts and the intermediation

























This is a symmetric equilibrium in which the market of deposits is divided in equal shares
for each bank. The division of the deposits market is represented in Figure 6.
Some interesting results arise comparing the equilibria and outcomes of the benchmark
game and those of the two-stage game (Case 1). The main results of this comparison are
summarized in the following propositions.
Proposition 6 If there is horizontal dominance in the described two-stage game then the
deposit interest rates, the deposit market shares and the intermediation spreads for both banks
are the same as those of the benchmark game.
Proof. Compare (39), (40) and (42) with (49),(50) and (52).
Proposition 7 If there is vertical dominance in the described two-stage game then the bank
that oﬀers a prize, pays a lower deposit interest rate, has a larger market share and enjoys
a wider intermediation spread than those that it has under the benchmark game.
Proof. Compare (44), (45) and (47) with (49),(50) and (52).
26Figure 6:
The last proposition supports the argument by Silver (1983). In particular, notice that
under vertical dominance the strategy of oﬀering prizes loosens some of the internal and
external constraints for a bank. The new strategy not only endows a bank with a new tool
to compete in the deposit market. It also allows the bank to achieve a larger deposit market
share and a wider intermediation spread if it oﬀers the biggest prize.
It is relevant to point out that under vertical dominance the proﬁts of the bank that
oﬀers a prize in the two-stage game are lower than the proﬁts of the same bank under
the benchmark game. This result can be explained by the introduction of costs associated
with the prizes. It is clear that these costs play a key role in the model. Once more this
result brings the attention upon some results of models of banking like Matutes and Padilla
(1994), Bouckaert and Degryse(1995) and Degryse (1996) in which the costs of the banking
technological innovations are omitted.
27We construct a model that allows us to understand the motivation of some Colombian banks
of oﬀering some promotional prizes and raﬄes to new potential savings customers. The new
strategy endows banks with a new tool to compete in the deposits markets without relying
exclusively on the use of deposit interest rates.
We study the impact of this promotional strategy on the deposit interest rates, the deposit
market shares and the intermediation spreads. We ﬁnd that this impact can be analyzed
by the equilibria of a two-stage game duopoly. In the ﬁrst stage banks compete with prizes
while in the second stage they compete with interest rates.
The types of equilibria that we ﬁnd depend on the type of dominance that prevails.
There are two types of dominance: horizontal and vertical. Under horizontal dominance
the diﬀerence between the value of the prizes oﬀered by the banks is less than the unitary
cost of transportation of the customers. The equilibria under this type of dominance imply
that both banks serve all the customers regardless of the subjective probability that these
customers assign to winning prizes. Under vertical dominance the diﬀerence between the
value of the prizes oﬀered by the banks is greater than the unitary cost of transportation of
the customers. In equilibrium this type of dominance allows one bank to segment the deposit
market in terms of the customers probability-type. In general, the bank that oﬀers the
highest prize also serves only customers that assign high subjective probabilities to winning
prizes. On the other hand the bank that oﬀers the lowest prize, or no prize, specializes in
serving customers that assign very low probability to win prizes.
From the equilibria of the two-stage game, we derive the following interesting results.
Under horizontal dominance a symmetric equilibrium is obtained in which both banks not
only oﬀer the same prizes’ value but also pay the same deposit interest rates, have the same
deposit market shares and receive the same proﬁts. Under vertical dominance only one bank
oﬀers a positive prize allowing it to segment the deposit market in terms of the customers
probability-type. This bank not only pays the lowest deposit interest rate but also has the
largest market share and enjoys the widest intermediation spread.
Finally we introduce a benchmark game to be able to understand what has changed in
the Colombian banking structure with the introduction of promotional prize strategies. This
benchmark game is deﬁned as the situation in which banks do not oﬀer any prize and compete
only in deposit interest rates. Comparing the equilibrium of this game with equilibrium of the
two-stage game we deduce the following results. Under the horizontal dominance equilibrium
28the deposit interest rates, the deposit market shares and the intermediation spreads are the
same as the ones of the benchmark game. Under vertical dominance, the bank that oﬀers
the highest prize, pays a lower deposit interest rate, has a larger deposit market share and
enjoys a wider intermediation spread than those that it has under the benchmark game.
In this appendix we derive the demand for deposits for Bank 1. To accomplish this task it
is necessary to integrate the function x(θ)o fe q u a t i o n( 3 )o v e r[ 0 ,1] taking into account the
appropriate range of the interest rate r1. There are 5 cases for each type of dominance.
Suppose that r2 is given. For ”very low” values of r1, and independently of the type
of dominance, the line x(θ) does not cross the unit square. This deﬁnes the segment of the
demand that we call DI
1. Equivalently when r1 [0,r 2
t
2 (q1 q2)] = [0,r min




1 = 0 (53)
For ”low” values of r1,g i v e nr2 and independently of the slope
(q1−q2)
t , the line x(θ)
crosses the bottom and the right side of the unit square. This determines the segment of the
demand that we call DII
1 . In this case the same demand functional form DII
1 holds for both
types of dominance. However, the range of the interest rate in which this functional form
is valid varies according to the type of dominance. If horizontal dominance (q1 q2 <t )
prevails then r1 [r2
t




1,h]. On the other hand if vertical
dominance (q1 q2 >t )p r e v a i l st h e nr1 [r2
t
2 (q1 q2),r 2+ t



































29Given r2 and for ”intermediate values” r1 the function x(θ) can cross either the vertical
sides or the horizontal sides of the unit square. The ﬁrst case implies horizontal dominance
and the second case implies vertical dominance. Under horizontal dominance (q1 q2 <t )
we have that r1 [r2
t
2,r 2+ t
2 (q1 q2)] = [r1
1,h,r 2
1,h] and the demand function for deposits
































































[r1 r2 +( q1 q2)] (56)
For ”high” values of r1,g i v e nr2 and independently of the slope
(q1−q2)
t ,t h el i n ex(θ)
crosses the top and the left side of the unit square. This deﬁnes the segment of the demand
that we call DIV
1 . In this case the same demand functional form DIV
1 applies to both
types of dominance. However, the range of the interest rate in which this demand holds
varies with the type of dominance. If horizontal dominance (q1 q2 <t )p r e v a i l st h e n
r1 [r2 + t
2 (q1 q2),r 2 + t
2]=[ r2
1,h,r max
1 ]. If vertical dominance (q1 q2 >t )p r e v a i l s
then r1 [r2
t
2,r 2 + t
2]=[ r2
1,v,r max



































This determines the segment of the demand that we call DIV
1 . Finally, given r2, for ”very
high” values of r1 ,and regardless of the type of dominance, the line x(θ) does not cross the
unit square. This deﬁnes the segment of the demand that we call DV
1 .E q u i v a l e n t l yw h e n
r1 [r2 + t
2, )=[ rmax
1 , ) ,w ec a ne s t a b l i s ht h a t
D
V
1 = 1 (58)
Note that DII
1 is strictly convex, DIII
1,h and DIII
1,v are linear, and DIV
1 is strictly concave in
r1. All of these segments are increasing in r1. To prove it, assume that q1 >q 2 and deﬁne

















































In addition notice that under horizontal dominance and vertical dominance the demand































































It is straightforward to prove the continuity of the proﬁt functions since the demand functions
are continuous. Moreover the convexity of the proﬁt functions can be stated as follows.
Under horizontal dominance, deﬁning ∆q = q1 q2 and using the results from Appendix






























































































1 is strictly convex and πIII
1,h,πIII
1,v and πIV
1 are strictly concave. The analysis
for the proﬁts functions of Bank 2 leads to similar results.
32Case 2
As was stated above under horizontal dominance the results presented by equations
(30)and (31) are valid if r1 [rmin
1 ,r 1
1,h]a n dr2 [r2
2,h,r max
2 ]. Under vertical dominance the
results presented by equations (30)and (31) hold if r1 [rmin
1 ,r 1
1,v]a n dr2 [r2
2,v,r max
2 ]. The
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Under horizontal dominance the results presented by equations (34) and (35) are valid
if r1 [r2
1,h,r max
1 ]a n dr2 [rmin
1 ,r 1
2,h]. Under vertical dominance the results presented by
equations (34) and (35) hold if r1 [r2
1,v,r max
1 ]a n dr2 [rmin
1 ,r 1
2,h]. The proﬁt maximization




































and the solution is
r
∗∗∗
1 = R +






t + t2 +3 2 ∆qt
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(62)
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